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TORT LAW-Evolution of Duty in New Mexico: Torres v.
State
I. INTRODUCTION
Torres v. State' changes the manner in which a judge should determine
duty in a negligence case in New Mexico. In deference to the legislative
branch, Torres holds, first, that if there is existing applicable legal policy
(in the form of statutes or common law), 2 then that policy is the only
policy source to which a judge may look in determining duty. Second,
if there is no existing law, a court may formulate social policy, balancing
the different interests at stake, to determine if a defendant had a duty
to a plaintiff.3
The Torres Court further held that foreseeability 4 is a factual question
for the jury to answer, again giving away some of its decision-making
power. A court no longer should use foreseeability as a legal fiction for
restricting or expanding liability. Foreseeability is now an explicit factual
element of negligence that the plaintiff must prove. Of course, because
it is a factual question, the judge may take the question of foreseeability
away from the jury if she finds that no reasonable jury could decide
that the plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable to the
defendant as a result of the defendant's conduct.
Further, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Torres did not uphold the
Ramirez v. Armstrong rule that if a plaintiff is foreseeable, then a duty
is owed to that plaintiff.' Legal policy can preclude a duty being owed
to a plaintiff, even if that plaintiff is factually foreseeable. 6 However,
it is unclear whether absence of foreseeability remains a component of
the judicial test for duty or whether the issue of foreseeability instead
controls negligence when the plaintiff, or injury to that plaintiff, is
unforeseeable to any reasonable mind.
This Note briefly explores the confusing mix of past judicial tests for
duty in New Mexico, examines the Torres rationale, and discusses the
significance of the Torres decision.
1. 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (1995).
2. Existing legal policy also refers to executive orders or administrative rules. 119 N.M. at 612,
894 P.2d at 389. The discussion in this casenote is limited to the context of statutes and case law
because that was the nature of the existing law in Torres.
3. 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
4. Throughout this casenote, unless otherwise indicated, the term "foreseeability" will refer to
the foreseeability to the defendant of a plaintiff and of some injury to that plaintiff.
5. See 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390; Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673
P.2d 822, 825 (1983).
6. See 119 N.M. at 615, 829 P.2d at 392. See also Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M.
566, 573, 829 P.2d 645, 652 (1992) (Ransom, J., specially concurring).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts7
On the morning of November 29, 1988, a gunman killed three people
in an Albuquerque bagel shop. Witnesses described the gunman to the
Albuquerque Police Department (APD). The Mayor instructed APD to
put as many officers as needed on the case and authorized all necessary
overtime. According to APD reports to the media, APD officers guarded
the airport, train, and bus stations in an attempt to stop the gunman
from leaving Albuquerque.8
On the afternoon of November 29, 1988, an Albuquerque gun shop
employee informed a state public safety officer that a Nathan Trupp had,
purchased a handgun on November 28, 1988, and that Trupp matched
the description of the bagel shop gunman. The gun shop employee also
gave the safety officer Trupp's address. The safety officer attempted to
contact his liaison at APD and the police officer investigating the case,
but was unsuccessful.
On November 30, 1988, at about 8:30 a.m., the safety officer directly
relayed the information he had to APD. Additionally, that morning, a
cab driver informed him and the APD investigating officer about his
contacts with Trupp, giving a description of Trupp, Trupp's address, a
summary of Trupp's activities on November 28, including the purchase
of a handgun and the opinion that he believed Trupp was mentally
unstable.
At 10:30 a.m. on November 30, 1988, APD sent officers to Trupp's
apartment complex. The APD officers observed Trupp's apartment until
1:30 p.m. when they forcibly entered it. However, Trupp had fled the
building at 9:00 a.m., leaving Albuquerque for Los Angeles, California
by bus at 12:30 p.m. After they discovered Trupp gone, APD stationed
police officers at the airport and at the train and bus stations. Trupp
subsequently was found to have committed the Albuquerque bagel shop
murders.
On December 1, 1988, the same day that Trupp arrived in Los Angeles,
Trupp shot and killed Universal Studio security guards Armando Torres
and Jeren Beeks.
B. Procedure
On November 29, 1990, the personal representatives of the estates of
Torres and Beeks filed a wrongful death action under §§ 41-4-1 to 41-
7. The facts are paraphrased from Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 611-12, 894 P.2d 386, 388-
89 (1995).
8. It is unclear from the facts given in the Court's opinion if APD did in fact, on November
29, have officers guarding the airport, train, and bus stations. The fact that APD stationed officers
at the airport, train, and bus stations after they discovered on November 30 that the gunman had
left town indicates that APD may not have had officers standing guard on November 29.
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4-27 of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. 9 (The plaintiffs amended their
complaint on December 3, 1990.) Their complaint alleged that APD and
the New Mexico Department of Public Safety (DPS) had breached their
statutory duty to investigate and their common-law duty to exercise
ordinary care (for the safety of others foreseeably at risk from assault
by the same gunman) by reasonably prudent and qualified officers in
light of the nature of the crime and the urgency of the investigation.
The plaintiffs claimed that "as a direct and proximate result of Defen-
dants' negligence in investigating certain killings committed in Albuqu-
erque on November 29, 1988, Torres and Beeks were murdered in Universal
City, California on December 1, 1988."10
The district court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs' amended
complaint, holding that "as a matter of law, the injured parties were
not foreseeable plaintiffs and the defendants owed no duty to plain-
tiff[s]."" The plaintiffs appealed the district court's order of dismissal. 2
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, but on
the grounds of policy. 3 Even though the court did not agree that "the
concept of duty can be automatically confined to a geographic area,"
it refused to extend the duty to investigate and the duty to exercise
ordinary care in this case because such a duty would be "unrealistic in
light of rising criminal activity and limited public resources.' ' 4 The Court
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -27 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 & Supp. 1994).
10. Torres v. State, 116 N.M. 379, 380, 862 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993).
Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleged that the APD never requested an interstate
warrant from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for Trupp; nor requested
the FBI to become involved in the hunt for Trupp; nor notified any out-of-state
law enforcement authorities of the bagel shop killings or the fact that Trupp had
not been apprehended.
Id. at 381-82, 862 P.2d at 1240-41.
11. Id. at 381, 862 P.2d at 1240 (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 380, 862 P.2d at 1239.
The plaintiffs raised on appeal "two interrelated issues: (1) whether Defendants owed a duty to
Plaintiffs' decedents, [Torres and Beeks], and (2) whether the murders of Torres and Beeks were
reasonably foreseeable." 116 N.M. at 380, 862 P.2d at 1239. The plaintiffs, citing Schear v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984), argued that the "Defendants had the
duty to investigate the murders committed by Trupp and to take reasonable steps to apprehend
Trupp so as to prevent additional harm to members of the public, even though the officers may
not know the specific identity of potential plaintiffs." 116 N.M. at 382, 862 P.2d at 1241. The
plaintiffs also contended, citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) of the Law Enforcement
Chapter, that the "Defendants owed the general public a duty to investigate violations of criminal
law" and that "this duty extended to Torres and Beeks due to the 'foreseeability of risk of injury'
to the public if Defendants failed to apprehend Trupp." 116 N.M. at 382, 862 P.2d at 1241. The
plaintiffs further contended that the fact Torres and Beeks lived in California did not abrogate the
defendants' duty to Torres and Beeks. Id.
In response, the defendants argued "that as a matter of policy, based on statutes and case
precedent, the risk of harm to the Plaintiffs was so remote that Defendants owed no duty to
Plaintiffs." 116 N.M. at 382, 862 P.2d at 1241. The defendants contended that a number of statutes
"evince[] a legislative intent to limit the liability of law enforcement officers to the areas wherein
they have jurisdiction or authority to act." Id. The defendants further argued that "Section 29-1-
1 is part of the chapter on law enforcement and therefore should be considered in the context of
other sections pertaining to law enforcement." Id.
13. Id. at 383-84, 862 P.2d at 1242-43.
14. Id.
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of Appeals further held that neither the statutory duty to investigate nor
common law duty mandates that law enforcement officers have a duty
to "promptly investigate and solve every reported homicide case."' 5 The
Court of Appeals did not address the foreseeability issue, "[in light of
its holding that as a matter of policy APD and DPS did not owe a
duty to the victims . *... ,,6 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case.' 7
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although citing the foreseeability definition set forth in Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad," the New Mexico Supreme Court has used factual
foreseeability,' 9 legal policy, 20 social policy, 2' or a combination of the
three,,.to determine the existence or non-existence of duty.2 2 The incon-
sistency in past analyses of duty is illustrated by four New Mexico Supreme
Court cases: Ramirez v. Armstrong,23 Calkins v. Cox Estates,24 Solon v.
WEK Drilling Co.,25 and Romero v. Byers, 26 and Justice Ransom's non-
majority opinions in Calkins and Solon. These cases and Justice Ransom's
opinions provide an important contextual background for the analysis
of the Torres opinion which follows.
A. Ramirez v. Armstrong
A unanimous court in Ramirez v. Armstrong,27 held that foreseeability
is controlling of duty: "If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that
plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the
defendant." ' 2 The Court in Ramirez brandished the "foreseeability duty
test," without actually applying it, relying instead on policy interests.
15. Id.
16. Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
17. Id. at 616, 894 P.2d at 393.
18. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
19. Foreseeability (to the defendant of the plaintiff and some injury to that plaintiff) is a factual
question and not a question of law or policy. Torres, 119 N.M, at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
20. Legal policy is existing law (e.g., statutes, administrative rules, or common law/case law
precedent). See Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
21. Social or public policy is that which is formulated by a court to decide the case at bar.
See Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
22. See, e.g., Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 425-26, 872 P.2d 840, 843-44 (1994); Solon v.
WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 569, 829 P.2d 645, 648 (1992); Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110
N.M. 59, 61-62, 792 P.2d 36, 38-39 (1990); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100-N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d
822, 825 (1983).
23. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
24. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990).
25. 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992).
26. 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994).
27. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
28. Id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 (citations omitted). The Ramirez court misconstrued Palsgraf
by citing it for the proposition that if there is foreseeability (of the plaintiff and injury to that
plaintiff), then a duty is owed (to that plaintiff by the defendant). Palsgraf actually held that if
a plaintiff is unforeseeable, then there is no duty. 162 N.E. at 100, 101. The converse is not
necessarily true (i.e., if the plaintiff is foreseeable, then a duty is owed). See Solon v. WEK Drilling
Co., 113 N.M. 566, 572, 829 P.2d 645, 651 (1992) (Ransom, J., concurring).
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Additionally, the Court treated policy and foreseeability as essentially
equivalent concepts, while at the same time stating that policy and
foreseeability are distinct. The Court's application of Palsgraf and its
view of foreseeability and policy demonstrate the confusion surrounding
policy and foreseeability conceptually and as creators of duty.
B. Calkins v. Cox Estates
Seven years later, in Calkins v. Cox Estates,29 Justice Baca explicitly
found that both policy and foreseeability create duty, citing Palsgraf and
Ramirez.3 0 Justice Baca outlined a two-part judicially-implemented' test
for duty: (l)(a) examine existing law ("legal precedent, statutes, and other
principles comprising the law");3 or (b), if there is no existing law,
formulate public policy by balancing the public policy interests involved
("the relationship of the parties, the plaintiff's injured interests, and the
defendant's conduct");32 and (2) analyze the foreseeability of the plaintiff
and the injury to that plaintiff." However, it is unclear whether the
court viewed foreseeability as an element derived from policy, as an
element derived from fact, or both.
C. Solon v. WEK Drilling Co.
In Solon v. WEK Drilling Co.,34 Justice Montgomery used both factual
foreseeability and policy arguments as reasons for holding that the plain-
tiffs did not state a sufficient common law action, independent of New
Mexico's Wrongful Death Act, for the loss of their son. Instead of
applying the Calkins two-pronged duty test, 35 the court quoted Ramirez
and cited Palsgraf for the proposition that if a plaintiff, and injury to
that plaintiff are foreseeable, then a duty is owed.36 The Court further
noted that Ramirez looked also to policy interests in determining duty,
notwithstanding the foreseeability test it established. 37 Because the court
shifts back and forth between whether factual foreseeability or public
policy determine duty without choosing either or both, the Court's decision
29. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990). Justice Baca wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief
Justice Sosa, Justice Montgomery, and Justice Wilson concurred, and Justice Ransom dissented.
See discussion infra part E.A for Justice Ransom's dissenting opinion.
30. 110 N.M. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39. See also Justice Baca's footnote, id. at 62 n.l, 792 P.2d
at 39 n.l.
31. Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
32. Id. at 63, 792 P.2d at 40. Justice Baca's rationale for using a balancing test, as a default
for when no legal policy existed, was that existing legal policy was itself the result of a previous
balancing of interests. Id. Justice Baca's balancing test is similar to the Ramirez court's policy
rationale of protecting certain interests. 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983).
33. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 65, 792 P.2d at 42.
34. 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992). Justice Baca concurred in Justice Montgomery's opinion
and Chief Justice Ransom specially concurred in the opinion. See discussion infra part E.2 for
discussion of Chief Justice Ransom's special concurrence.
35. The Solon court did not apply Calkins or discuss legal policy versus social policy except,
implicitly, in its finding that the plaintiffs' claim was for relief independent of New Mexico's
Wrongful Death Act (i.e., legal policy did not apply). 113 N.M. at 568, 829 P.2d at 647.
36. Solon, 113 N.M. at 569, 829 P.2d at 648.
37. Id. at 570, 829 P.2d at 649.
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does not diminish the confusion surrounding the judicial determination
of duty.
D. Romero v. Byers
In Romero v. Byers,38 the court, which included Chief Justice Mont-
gomery and Justices Baca, Ransom, and Frost in a unanimous opinion,
once again held that foreseeability was the crux of the test for duty.39
However, the Court's determination of foreseeability of the plaintiffs was
based on case law precedent (i.e., legal policy)4 and not on a factual
determination or on social policy. 4' This conception of duty confuses
foreseeability with legal policy, just as Justice Baca in Calkins and Justice
Montgomery in Solon confused foreseeability with social policy.
E. Justice Ransom's Opinions
1. Calkins v. Cox Estates
In his dissenting opinion in Calkins,42 Justice Ransom argued that
foreseeability is controlling of duty only when it is absent-when the
plaintiff is unforeseeable to the defendant. 43 Justice Ransom differentiated
foreseeability from policy, stating that the former is factual and the latter
is not.4 4 He nonetheless looked to public policy arguments rather than
to statutory and common law in his analysis of whether the defendant
owed a duty to the victim. 45
2. Solon v. WEK Drilling Co.
Although Chief Justice Ransom concurred with the opinion in Solon,46
he vigorously disagreed with Justice Montgomery's majority opinion for-
mulating the duty analysis.4 7 Chief Justice Ransom argued that "existing
legal policy," (i.e., existing law) not foreseeability, should be used to
38. 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994).
39. "The core issue is one of duty .... In a series of New Mexico cases culminating in Solon
v. WEK Drilling Co., this Court set out the test for determining whether a duty is owed to a
plaintiff." 117 N.M. at 425, 872 P.2d at 843 (citation omitted). The Romero court goes on, quoting
and citing the language of Ramirez, Calkins, and Solon. Id. at 425-26, 872 P.2d at 843-44.
Romero also may have had a Ramirez-type policy basis, i.e., a determination that loss of spousal
consortium was an interest that should be legally recognized and protected.
40. 117 N.M. at 426, 872 P.2d at 844.
41. 117 N.M. at 425, 426, 872 P.2d at 843-44.
42. 110 N.M. 59, 66, 792 P.2d 36, 43 (1990).
43. Id. at 67-68, 792 P.2d at 44-45.
44. Torres, 119 N.M. at 612-16, 894 P.2d at 389-93. Justice Ransom construed foreseeability
as a factual issue; however, other justices, in their usage of foreseeability to determine duty, turned
foreseeability into a policy issue. It is this transformation of foreseeability from a factual issue to
a policy issue, while simultaneously maintaining that foreseeability is factual, with which Justice
Ransom disagrees.
45. 110 N.M. at 67-68, 792 P.2d at 44-45. The differences in Justice Baca and Justice Ransom's
opinions may lie partially in their different interpretations of the applicable statutes. See id. at 65-
68, 792 P.2d at 42-45.
46. 113 N.M. 572, 829 P.2d 651.
47. Id. at 572-73, 829 P.2d at 651-52.
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determine duty.48 In direct contrast to the majority opinion and to the
Ramirez duty test, Chief Justice Ransom found that even though, in his
eyes, the plaintiffs were factually foreseeable 49 and that they had strong
interests and public policy on their side,5 0 the plaintiffs were not owed
a duty because of legal policy." Chief Justice Ransom reasoned that
social policy arguments are irrelevant to determining duty if there is
existing law to guide a judge in her determination.12 Under his analysis,
"foreseeability," is a factual concept, not a policy concept. 3
F. Summary
Foreseeability has been the test proclaimed to determine duty since at
least 1983-but not all New Mexico Supreme Court Justices have followed
the foreseeability standard. While New Mexico Supreme Court Justices,
with the exception of Justice Ransom5 4 have upheld the principle that
foreseeability is an integral component of the duty analysis performed
by a judge, they have also turned to policy rationales to determine duty.
To further confuse matters, the Justices, including Justice Ransom, have
not clearly defined "foreseeability" and/or "policy." It is in this context
that the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Torres v. State.
IV. DISCUSSION
In Torres v. State,5 the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected both the
Court of Appeals' reasoning that as a matter of policy the defendants
owed no duty to the plaintiffs and the trial court's holding that the
plaintiffs were unforeseeable as a matter of law, and thus were owed
no duty by the defendants. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that
police officers have both a statutory and a common law duty to exercise
"that care ordinarily exercised by reasonably prudent and qualified of-
ficers," '5 6 toward those foreseeably at risk and that the class of persons
to be protected was not limited by state boundaries.5 7 The court then
48. Id. at 572, 829 P.2d at 651. The differences in Justice Montgomery and Chief Justice
Ransom's opinions again may lie partially in their differing interpretations of the relevance and
applicability of New Mexico's Wrongful Death Act to the plaintiffs' claims. See 113 N.M. at 568-
69, 573, 892 P.2d at 647-48, 652.
49. 113 N.M. at 573, 829 P.2d at 652. To Chief Justice Ransom, Justice Montgomery's denial
of duty because the plaintiffs were "unforeseeable," when the plaintiffs were in fact very factually
foreseeable, was unacceptable. Id.
50. 113 N.M. at 573, 829 P.2d at 652.
51. Id. at 572-73, 829 P.2d at 651-52.
52. Id. at 572-73,. 829 P.2d at 651-52. See also Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 429, 872 P.2d
840, 847 (1994).
53. Id. at 572-573, 829 P.2d at 651-52.
54. This is notwithstanding Justice Ransom's opinion in Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M. 422, 872
P.2d 840 (1994). The importance of a united front in the declaration of a new cause of action
may have been behind the lack of concurring opinions.
55. 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (1995). Justice Ransom wrote the unanimous decision in which
Justices Franchini and Minzner concurred.
56. Torres, 119 N.M. at 616, 894 P.2d at 393.
57. Id. at 614, 894 P.2d at 391.
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went on to say. that "foreseeability, breach, proximate cause, and com-
parative liability are questions for the jury." '58 As a result, the court
appeared to take foreseeability out of the duty analysis.
A. Policy: Legal Policy Before Social Policy; Legislature Before
Court
The Supreme Court in Torres, distinguishing established legal policy
from public policy, held that "policy determines duty," but that "the
policy reasons advanced by the Court of Appeals [were] not determinative"
because the legislature had already spoken. 9 Furthermore, the court stated
that New Mexico case law has defined the duty of law enforcement
officers to include the exercise of care ordinarily exercised by reasonably
prudent officers in similar circumstances; 6° and the prevention of "injury
to a person whom the officer would foresee to be exposed to risks of
injury. ' 61 The Court interpreted both New Mexico statutory law and
case law as not limiting the scope of the class to whom law enforcement
officers owe a duty.62
Additionally, the Court found that New Mexico case law holds that
"the statutory duty to investigate 'is for the benefit and protection of
the public ' ' 63 and is not "specifically limited to identified victims or to
58. Id. at 616, 894 P.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389. "In this case the Court of Appeals has formulated public
policy by which it restricts the statutory duty of law enforcement officers. It is not necessary,
however, for the courts to formulate policy in order to apply the law to this case." Id. at 613,
894 P.2d at 390. The court, for support of its interpretation of legislative policy, cited New Mexico
case law and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 224
& 227 (5th ed. 1984).
The court's finding here is reminiscent of Justice Baca's finding in Calkins v. Cox Estates. 110
N.M. 59, 63, 792 P.2d 36, 40 (1990).
The court found that the legislature had imposed a duty on law enforcement officers in N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 29-1-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (Law Enforcement Chapter) and in N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (New Mexico Tort Claims Act). 119 N.M. at 612, 614, 615, 894 P.2d
at 389, 391, 392.
That the Legislature had not spoken also influenced the court. 119 N.M. at 614, 894 P.2d at
391.
60. 119 N.M. at 612-15, 894 P.2d at 389-92 (citing Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101
N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984) and California First Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646
(1990)).
61. 119 N.M. at 614, 894 P.2d at 391 (quoting Cross v. City of Clovis, 107 N.M. 251, 254,
755 P.2d 589, 592 (1988)).
62. Id. at 615-16, 894 P.2d at 392-93. The Court stated:
Based on Schear and California First Bank, we hold that when any person "of
the public" (regardless of geographic location) is foreseeably at risk of injury by
a party reported to be in violation of the criminal law, officers undertaking an
investigation of the crime owe that person a duty to exercise the care ordinarily
exercised by prudent and qualified officers.
Id. at 615, 894 P.2d at 392 (possibly quoting Wittkowski v. State, 103 N.M. 526, 531, 710 P.2d
93, 98 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d 1047 (1985), overruled on other
grounds by Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 477, 745 P.2d 380, 385 (1987)).
The Court's interpretation is in contrast to the defendants' arguments. See supra note 12.
63. 119 N.M. at 615, 894 P.2d at 392 (quoting Wittkowski v. State, 103 N.M. 526, 531, 710
P.2d 93, 98 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d 1047 (1985), overruled on
other grounds by Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987)).
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a specific segment of the population imminently at risk." ' The New
Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that geographical
or political boundaries do not limit a law enforcement officer's duty.6 5
Therefore, neither the immanency of danger a victim is in nor police
knowledge of identity and condition of criminal or of victim(s) are
determinative in defining duty. 6 According to Justice Ransom, courts
cannot limit the duty owed by law enforcement officers to solely New
Mexicans because the legislature and the common law have not (and,
logically, could not have) limited the duty of law enforcement officers
to residents of New Mexico. 67
The Court's rationale in Torres is based on deference to "constitutional
principles" 6 and majoritarianism.
[I]t is the particular domain of the legislature ... to make public
policy .... The judiciary, however, is not as directly and politically
responsible to the people as are the legislative and executive branches
of government. Courts should make policy in order to determine duty
only when the body politic has not spoken .... 69
According to the Court, "the body politic" has defined "the existing
public policy with respect to governmental liability for acts or omissions
of law enforcement officers .... "70
B. Foreseeability: Fact Not Policy; Jury Not Judge
Justice Ransom also disagreed with the district court's finding that
APD and DPS owed the victims no duty because the victims were not
foreseeable. 71 First, Justice Ransom found that the victims were within
the "general population" to whom the duty to investigate is owed as a
matter of statutory and common law. Second, Justice Ransom reasoned
64. 119 N.M. at 614, 615, 894 P.2d at 391, 392 (citing Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs,
101 N.M. 671, 676, 687 P.2d 728, 733 (1984), and California First Bank, 111 N.M. 64, 74 n.7,
75, 801 P.2d 646, 656, n.7, 657 (1990).
65. 119 N.M. at 615, 894 P.2d at 392. The Court stated:
We agree because, although the class of persons the legislature sought to protect
is not stated explicitly, to limit the class to those within the state would lead to
illogical results .... If we were to hold that the duty to investigate was limited
by state boundaries, we must infer that the legislature intended to discriminate
against foreseeable victims a stone's throw across the border in favor of foreseeable
victims 300 miles across the state .... There is no reason to [do] so .... Because
it is now as easy to travel from Albuquerque to Los Angeles as it is to travel
from Albuquerque to Las Cruces, New Mexico, the statutory duty to investigate
logically must extend to benefit or protect all foreseeable victims, including those
persons outside the state.
Id. at 615, 894 P.2d at 392 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 614, 615, 894 P.2d at 391, 392.
67. Id. It is the Court's interpretation or articulation of statutory law and decisional law that
results in it's conclusion that the state legislature or common law does not limit the duty of law
enforcement officers to New Mexico's citizens.
68. Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 613-14, 894 P.2d at 390-91.
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that whether the victims were persons "foreseeably at risk within the
general population" is a question of fact and, as such, a question for
the jury or factfinder to determine. 72 The Supreme Court held "that the
amended complaint ... stated a set of facts under which Torres and
Beeks might prevail on the issue of foreseeability. ' ' 73 As a result, the
jury had to determine the plaintiff's foreseeability as an issue of fact,
like breach, proximate cause, and comparative negligence.7 4
V. ANALYSIS
Justice Ransom's opinion in Torres does many things, but still does
not eliminate the confusion enveloping the judicial determination of duty.
The Court held that duty is created by policy, which is to be determined
first by the legislature and then by the courts, and that foreseeability is
only a threshold question for judges, with the main decision-making
power being held by the jury, except in special circumstances. 7  By
delineating the terms "policy" (echoing Justice Baca's opinion in Calkins
v. Cox Estates)76 and "foreseeability" and by allocating decision-making
power, the decision has clarified what "policy" and "foreseeability"
are.
77
Torres gives the "public mind" a much greater say in where the line
of liability will be drawn by granting the legislature's enactments more
weight and by expanding the role of the jury.
Courts traditionally have feared becoming the nursemaids of unrea-
sonable tort litigation and, thus, have used their power to determine duty
so as to limit such litigation, acting as flood gates. However, the result
of the Torres Court's hierarchy of policy types and its bifurcation of
foreseeability is a dispersal of judicial power. The Court explicitly has
given a portion of its "gate-keeper" role first to the legislature (and the
executive) 78 and secondly to juries (or "the people"). The drawstrings of
72. Torres, 119 N.M. at 615-16, 894 P.2d at 392-93 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 614, 894 P.2d at 391.
74. Id. at 616, 894 P.2d at 393.
75. Id. at 612-14, 894 P.2d at 389-91. See supra parts III.B. and III.E.I.
76. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990).
77. Legal policy is law which already exists (e.g., statutes, administrative rules, or common law/
case law precedent). 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389. Law is the only source of duty, unless no
law exists. 119 N.M. at 612-13, 894 P.2d at 389-90. Public or social policy is that which is formulated
by a court to decide the case at bar using a balancing test to weigh the interests at hand and social
policy arguments. 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389. Policy arguments and balancing tests are to
be used only when the legislative or executive branches have not spoken on an issue, and not in
place of existing law (as the Court of Appeals did in Torres), and not when the plaintiff is
"unforeseeable" (as Justice Montgomery did in Solon). 119 N.M. at 612-13, 894 P.2d at 389-90.
Foreseeability (to the defendant of the plaintiff and some injury to that plaintiff) is a factual
question rather than a question of law or policy. 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
78. The legislative body has always had the power to limit litigation and to create legal duties
through its enactments. Courts, however, do not always "hear" the voice of the legislature. See,
e.g., the Court of Appeals' decision in Torres, 116 N.M. 379, 383, 384, 862 P.2d 1238, 1242, 1243
(Ct. App. 1993), and the differing opinions in Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 67, 68, 792
P.2d 36, 44, 45 (1990), and Solon v. WEK Drilling, Co., 113 N.M. 566, 568-69, 572, 829 P.2d
645, 647-48, 651 (1992) on whether or not statutory law applied. By stating that "it is the particular
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tort litigation are no longer held primarily by the judiciary, but rest now
also in majoritarian hands.
The rules set out by Justice Ransom in Torres should result in more
predictability in the method by which a court will decide the issue of
duty and more consistency of results.
The Torres test while clearly outlined is also flexible and still allows
judges room to maneuver. If there is a statute or case law which is
explicitly inclusive of the plaintiff (e.g., the plaintiff is a member of a
class of persons protected by a statute) or of the defendant's duty, then
the judge's duty analysis ends (assuming foreseeability), and a duty is
owed (duty per se). On the other hand, if a statute or case law is explicitly
non-inclusive of a plaintiff or of a defendant, then no duty exists, and
the judge should dismiss the case (per se no duty). But, if ambiguity
exists in the law, then the judge must interpret the statute as to its
promulgation of a duty.
Calkins, Solon, and Torres all involved judicial interpretation of stat-
utory law and case law.79 The Torres Court defined the duty owed to
the "general population ' 80 and "the public ' 81 to include the victims and
the plaintiffs. Because judges still must define and interpret ambiguous
statutory terms, the Torres test will not be unduly restrictive on judges. 82
Additionally, the applicability or relevance of a statute or case precedent
to a claim of duty may depend on the value judgment of the judge.83
The Torres decision also implies that legislative policy can preclude
the owing of a duty to a plaintiff by a defendant, even when the plaintiff
domain of the legislature ... to make public policy," the Torres Court may have been instructing
the lower courts to pay closer attention to statutory law when determining duty. 119 N.M. at 612,
894 P.2d at 389.
79. See supra notes 45 and 48, for discussion of the interpretation of statutory and/or case law
in Calkins and Solon, respectively.
80. 119 N.M. at 614-15, 894 P.2d at 391-92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
81. Wittkowski v. Silva, 103 N.M. 526, 531, 710 P.2d 93, 98 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. quashed,
103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d 1047 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472,
477, 745 P.2d 380, 385 (1987); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 778
(1984); and California First Bank v. State, Ill N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646 (1990). See 119 N.M. at
614, 615, 894 P.2d at 391-92.
82. Judges also have some flexibility in deciding "whether the victim was unforeseeable to any
reasonable mind." 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390. While the district court in Torres found the
victims and plaintiffs unforeseeable, the New Mexico Supreme Court found the reverse.
It is not unlikely that a murderer would flee the city in which he committed the
crime and, given modern-day transportation, that this person would flee across
state lines. Further, the police knew or should have known that it is possible that
a person who kills randomly with no motive would kill again; it is the very
irrationality of the random killing that portends danger to others. The harm in
this case was not so removed from the conduct of the Defendants that we may
say as a matter of law that the victims were unforeseeable.
119 N.M. at 614, 894 P.2d at 391.
83. The disagreement between Justice Ransom and the majority in both Calkins and Solon is
an example of the value judgments surrounding a determination of the applicability of a law or
common law to a plaintiff's claim. See supra notes 45 and 48. See also Madrid v. Lincoln County
Medical Center, 121 N.M. 133, 909 P.2d 14, 19-20, 64 U.S.L.W. 2432, (Ct. App. 1995), cert.
granted by Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009 (1995).
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is foreseeable. No longer does foreseeability mandate obligation, as the
Ramirez test held. Additionally, there exists an overlap between legislative
policy and factual foreseeability. Sometimes legislative policy teaches what
is foreseeable. A plaintiff can be (but not necessarily is) foreseeable
because the legislature wrote the relevant statute broadly rather than
narrowly-but the question of foreseeability must still go to the jury to
see if the plaintiff was in fact "foreseeable.
' s4
The preliminary foreseeability question for a court after Torres is not
"Is the plaintiff, and injury to the plaintiff, foreseeable?," but is "Is
the plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, not unforeseeable?, '"85 altering
the crux of the foreseeability question from a positive issue to a negative
one and lowering the threshold of proof for plaintiffs on the issue of
foreseeability.
Furthermore, except possibly in limited circumstances, a court can no
longer base the existence or non-existence of duty on foreseeability. The
determination of foreseeability is now, generally, a purely factual issue
for the jury to determine, along with the other factual elements of
negligence. 86 Because foreseeability is a specifically enumerated jury ques-
tion, the plaintiff has an additional factual issue to prove.
Unfortunately, while the Torres Court was clear in its explication of
the hierarchy of policy types which can create duty and in its bifurcation
of foreseeability into a judicial threshold question and a jury determinative
question, the Court did not explicitly state how its methodology affected
New Mexico's judicial test for duty. It is unclear, as a result of the
Court's bifurcation of the foreseeability question and of its factual con-
ceptualization of foreseeability, if foreseeability remains a part of the
duty equation.
Two possible inferences concerning the elements of the duty equation
can be drawn from Justice Ransom's opinion: (1) foreseeability is part
of the duty equation, and controls duty, only when it is absent; 7 or (2)
84. 119 N.M. at 614-615, 894 P.2d at 391-392.
85. Compare the language used by the district court, "the injured parties were not foreseeable
plaintiffs," 116 N.M. 379, 381, 862 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting the district court's
order of dismissal) (emphasis added), with the language used by the Supreme Court, which focuses
on the unforeseeability of a victim. 119 N.M. at 613-14, 894 P.2d at 390-91.
86. 119 N.M. at 613-14, 616, 894 P.2d at 390-91, 393. The jury foreseeability question is not
a proximate cause question. 119 N.M. at 614, 616, 894 P.2d at 391, 393. The proximate cause
question asks whether the defendant's breach of her duty caused the plaintiff's injury. The proximate
cause questions also sometimes asks whether the manner of the injury to the plaintiff or victim
was foreseeable. The jury question of foreseeability asks if the plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff,
were foreseeable. For an application of the distinction between the jury questions of foreseeability
and proximate cause, see Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, 121 N.M. 133, 909 P.2d 14,
20, 64 U.S.L.W. 2432, (Ct. App. 1995), cert. granted, Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center,
120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009 (1995).
See also Justice Ransom's statement in his dissent in Calkins v. Cox Estates that foreseeability
is not an element of proximate cause, except in situations of independent intervening acts. 110 N.M.
59, 66, 792 P.2d 36, 43 (1990) (citing N.M. Sup. CT. RULES ANN., N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION
CIVIL 13-305 & 13-306 (1986)).
87. In other words, positive foreseeability no longer determines duty. But, negative foreseeability
(i.e., unforeseeability) does control duty.
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foreseeability is a separate question from duty, and controls negligence
when it is absent. In support of the first interpretation, the Court found
that a plaintiff's foreseeability, or the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, does not create duty. In fact, policy can preclude a duty, even
when the foreseeability of the plaintiff is uncontested. 8 Furthermore,
though the Ramirez foreseeability test has been the law of New Mexico
for determining duty and has been consistently quoted in New Mexico's
landmark tort cases, the Torres Court did not cite or quote Ramirez.
Consequently, foreseeability appears to no longer be a creator of duty,
as it was under the Ramirez test. However, unforeseeability precludes
relief and is to be determined by a judge "in reviewing whether a duty
exists." ' 89 Thus, unforeseeability may be a negative element.of duty, and
an exception to the new rule that foreseeability is not a creator of duty.
This interpretation is consistent with Justice Ransom's dissent in Calkins
v. Cox Estates9° and his special concurrence in Solon v. WEK Drilling
Co. 91
But, it is also possible that both foreseeability and unforeseeability
have been removed from the duty determination, and that the issue of
Foreseeability 92 is to be analyzed as a separate question from duty, as
are the other factual elements of negligence cases. Removal of the Fo-
reseeability question is evidenced by the Court's enumeration of Fore-
seeability as a jury question, along with breach, proximate cause, and
comparative negligence, and the Court's firm stance that Foreseeability
is a question of fact.
Logically, under Justice Ransom's view of policy and Foreseeability, 93
a court's threshold Foreseeability analysis should be completely separate
from it's duty analysis. Incorporation of the Foreseeability analysis into
the duty analysis is inconsistent with Justice Ransom's formulation of
88. See 119 N.M. at 615, 894 P.2d at 392. See also 113 N.M. 566, 572-73, 829 P.2d 645, 651-
52 (1992) (Ransom, C.J., specially concurring).
89. 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
Justice Ransom cites Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 61-62, 792 P.2d 36, 38-39 (1990);
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928); and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 43, at 284-285 (5th ed. 1984). The Palsgraf citation might
support an interpretation of Torres which finds that Foreseeability remains part of the duty equation.
On the other hand, the Court may have been using the Palsgraf citation to support its holding
that absence of foreseeability (i.e., unforeseeability) is the crux of the Foreseeability question, not
the existence of foreseeability.
The pages of Calkins and PRossER & KEETON cited do not shed much light on whether Justice
Ransom intended that the issue of Foreseeability be included in the judicial determination of duty,
if Foreseeability is a factor in the duty equation, or if Foreseeability is a separate issue altogether.
(See infra note 92 for explanation of "Foreseeability.")
90. 110 N.M. 59, 67, 68, 792 P.2d 36, 44, 45 (1990).
91. 113 N.M. 566, 572, 573, 829 P.2d 645, 651, 652 (1992).
92. To minimize confusion, "Foreseeability" with a capital "F" is used in the Analysis and
Implications sections of this casenote to indicate the general foreseeability issue. "Foreseeability"
when not capitalized (i.e., "foreseeability") is used to signify the narrow concept of positive
foreseeability, in contrast to unforeseeability.
93. See Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 613, 615, 616, 894 P.2d at 389, 390, 392, 393; Solon, 113
N.M. 566, 572, 573, 829 P.2d 645, 651, 652 (1992) (Ransom, C.J., specially concurring); Calkins,
110 N.M. 59, 67-68, 792 P.2d 36, 44-45 (1990) (Ransom, J., dissenting).
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Foreseeability as a factual, non-policy, jury question. An incorporation
of the Foreseeability question into the duty question may result in the
same conflation by judges and lawyers of Foreseeability with duty which
Justice Ransom appears to want eliminated.
Thus, a judge's determination as to whether she should remove the
question of Foreseeability from the jury should not be done as part of
her duty determination, but rather as its own distinct determination, in
the same manner the judge examines the other factual elements of neg-
ligence to see if they present questions for the jury to decide. 94 Rather
than unforeseeability resulting in no duty, unforeseeability should result
in no negligence-just like the result of an absence of any of the other
factual components of negligence.
In the final analysis, it is not clear whether Justice Ransom has removed
Foreseeability from the duty equation. The Torres opinion, unfortunately,
does not end the confusion surrounding the creation of duty and the
role of Foreseeability.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. "Letter to Defense and Plaintiff Attorneys"
The implications of the Torres duty formulation and the. steps an
attorney should take after Torres to advance her position on duty (and
Foreseeability) in a negligence case are as follows.
Statutes, and the case precedent, are the preeminent creators of duty
in New Mexico. 95 Attorneys should first search statutory law to see if
existing law establishes or denies a duty on the part of the defendant
to the plaintiff. If there is relevant existing statutory law, arguments to
the court should focus on the purported relevance, clarity, irrelevance,
or ambiguity of the law in relation to the duty trying to be established
by the plaintiff.
When the existing statutory law is not clearly applicable or explicit,
or is ambiguous, in its duty language, a judge has the leeway to interpret
the language of the law and thereby either find or not find a duty.
Arguments to the court, therefore, should focus on the interpretation of
the language which the attorney desires the court to apply.
94. Even where a ... fact question is to be decided by the jury, the judge still
retains his function of making sure there is sufficient evidence from which a rational
jury could find the ... fact. If not, [the question must be removed] from the
jury-but not because the judge has decided the ... fact question. Rather, the
judge would simply be holding that there was, in contemplation of the law, no
question to be decided. In our legal system, all jury questions presuppose a situation
in which the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding.
John Kaplan, Of Mabrus And Zorgs-An Essay In Honor Of David Louisell, 66 CAL. L. REv.
987, 993 (1978).
95. 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
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Case law is next in line in the policy hierarchy.9 If there is no applicable
existing statutory law, attorneys should then go to case law and repeat
the steps given above for statutory law.
If there is no statutory law and no case law, then an attorney's
arguments to the court should focus on general public policy and the
interest the attorney is trying to promote, because policy is what determines
duty when there is no existing law. 97 Policy arguments give a court great
latitude in determining whether a duty is owed. The court, to aid it in
determining if a duty is owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, will
probably use a balancing test similar to the one outlined by Justice Baca
in Calkins,98 where it weighs the relationship of the parties, the plaintiff's
injured interests, and the defendant's conduct. The court also may rely
on the Ramirez policy of protecting certain interests. 99
. Positive foreseeability (i.e., the factual foreseeability of the plaintiff,
and injury to that plaintiff) arguments should not be used to persuade
the court on the issue of duty because positive foreseeability no longer
is an acceptable rationale for the court to use to recognize or deny a
defendant's duty to a plaintiff. 100
However, negative foreseeability (i.e., the absence of foreseeability to
any reasonable mind) still may be an appropriate argument to present
to the judge. Whether or not negative foreseeability is part of the duty
analysis or is, instead, a distinct question will depend on one's inter-
pretation of Torres.
Negative foreseeability arguments should be used to persuade the court
on the preliminary question of Foreseeability. A judge can take the
question of Foreseeability away from the jury only if she finds that any
reasonable mind would determine that the plaintiff, or injury to that
plaintiff, was unforeseeable. In a situation where it is possible that a
judge would make such a finding, factual unforeseeability arguments
should be made to the court by the defendant's attorney and arguments
that the plaintiff was not unforeseeable should be made in response by
the plaintiff's attorney. Attorneys' arguments should center on factual
unforeseeability, not on legal or social policy, for even though a judge
makes her Foreseeability determination when reviewing whether a duty
exists, duty and Foreseeability appear to be separate questions. The
threshold of proof for the plaintiff on the initial issue of Foreseeability
is lower as a result of the change in focus from foreseeability to absence
of foreseeability.
Because Foreseeability is a separate issue for the jury to determine,
along with the other factual elements of negligence, once the judge's has
made her preliminary determination that the plaintiff is not unforeseeable,
attorneys should direct their Foreseeability arguments to the jury. These
96. See id.
97. 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
98. 110 N.M. 59, 63, 792 P.2d 36, 40 (1990).
99. 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983).
100. See 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390.
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arguments should be factual, and not policy-based. As a result, the
plaintiff will have an additional factual element to prove.
In a nutshell, defendants will have an extremely difficult time in getting
the claim filed against them dismissed before trial, if an explicit statutory
or common law duty exists and if there is any reasonable possibility that
the plaintiff, and the injury to that plaintiff, were not unforeseeable to
any reasonable mind.
On the other hand, plaintiffs will have a difficult time in getting their
case to trial and preventing their case from being dismissed, if statutory
law or case law explicitly has mandated either that the defendant does
not have the requisite duty or that the plaintiff is not in the class of
persons protected by the statute or case law in question (i.e., the plaintiff
is too "remote"). The plaintiff may also face dismissal of her case on
the factual issue of foreseeability if there is a strong argument that the
plaintiff was unforeseeable to any reasonable mind.
If the relevant statutory law or common law is not explicit about the
existence or nonexistence of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, then
the probability of the case being dismissed will depend on how ambiguous
the language of the law is in terms of duty creation and on the judge's
possible interpretations of the law.
Attorneys also need to be aware that there may no longer be blanket
coverage or per se foreseeability for plaintiffs bringing claims such as
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium, given
that the foreseeability determinations depend on the facts of the case,
rather than being presumptive.' 0 '
Finally, a new Civil Uniform Jury Instruction on the issue of Fore-
seeability, to replace New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction Civil 13-
2107a, 0 12 may be needed to assist the jury in analyzing the Foreseeability
issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Before Torres, New Mexico judges in negligence cases erratically used
the rationales of foreseeability, public policy, and/or law to explain why
they drew the "liability line" where they did. 103 Torres v. State refor-
101. See also Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, 121 N.M. 133, 909 P.2d 14, 19, 64
U.S.L.W. 2432, (Ct. App. 1995), cert. granted by Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, 120
N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009 (1995).
102. N.M. SuP. CT. RULES ANN., N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-2107a (1986), "Fore-
seeability as negligence", currently reads "No instruction to be given."
The "Directions for Use" state: "No instruction to be given in a negligence case on foreseeability
in any form other than the negligence instruction and ordinary care instruction which cover this
matter properly. See UJI 13-1601 and 13-1604." Id.
The Committee Comment notes that "foreseeability is actually an element of negligence and is
so stated in UJI 13-1601 .... ." Id. See also N.M. SuP. CT. RULES ANN., N.M. UNIF. JURY
INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1601 & 13-1604 (1986).
103. The shifting in rationales used has been confusing to judges and lawyers, as is illustrated
by comparing not only the negligence cases discussed supra part III., but also the lawyers' arguments
in Torres, supra note 12, and the differing decisions of the district court, Court of Appeals, and
Supreme Court in Torres, supra part lI.B.
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mulates the test in New Mexico for determining whether a duty is owed
to a plaintiff by a defendant and represents a change in the current state
of the law in New Mexico as to who determines the limits of a tortfeasor's
liability. Attorneys and the judiciary, as well as the state legislature and
the executive branch, must reconsider their approach to the establishment
of a duty to others and will need to incorporate in their thinking the
distinctions made by the Torres Court between "duty" and "foreseea-
bility" and among "(legal) policy," (i.e., existing law), "(public) policy,"
and "(factual) foreseeability."
While Torres goes far in clarifying the duty analysis, it, unfortunately,
does not completely untangle the relationship between the existence of
duty and factual foreseeability.1°4
NANCY DESIDERIO
104. Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, decided near press time, interprets Torres v.
State and provides an example of the application of the post-Torres duty and foreseeability con-
ceptualization discussed in this casenote. 121 N.M. 133, 909 P.2d 14, 64 U.S.L.W. 2432 (Ct. App.
1995), cert. granted by Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009
(Dec. 7, 1995).
Madrid, which allows a claim for emotional distress damages for fear of contracting a deadly
disease, such as HIV and hepatitis, does not grant blanket foreseeability. 909 P.2d at 18, 20. Madrid
exemplifies a situation not considered in depth in this casenote-where not only ambiguity exists
in the language of existing law, but also in the relevancy of a law to a specific case. 909 P.2d at
19-20. In addition, Madrid interprets Torres to end the "zone of danger" rule for determining duty
in New Mexico-an aspect of Torres not explicitly considered in this casenote. 909 P.2d at 17.
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